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The recent appreciation of the dollar is widely believed to have reduced
the output costs of the disinflation. But there remains the question of
whether those early gains have to be repaid when the exchange rate
depreciates.
The first question taken up is the effect of real exchange rate
appreciation on the sacrifice ratio, or output cost, of disinflation. There
is no unambiguous presumption that exchange rate appreciation reduces the
sacrifice ratio. The direct favorable effects of cheaper imports on consumer
prices, on the prices of imported inputs, and on wage demands, may be
outweighed by the unemployment resulting from the reduced demand for exports.
In the second part of the paper I examine the affects of wage indexation
on the sacrifice ratio. Economists have argued that wage indexation speeds
up disinflation; policymakers take the opposite view. The distinction
between ex ante and ex post indexing, defined in the paper, explains these
different views. Ex ante wage indexation speeds up disinflation. With ex
post indexation the real wage automatically rises when the inflation rate
falls. Even so, ex post indexing may speed up disinflation. But there has






(61 7)253—6666REAL BALANCES, THEEXCHANGERATE, AND INDEXATION: REAL VARIABLES IN
DIS INFLATION
Stanley Fischer*
It haslongbeen knownthatat some stage in a disinflation process
initiatedby a discrete reduction inthe growth rate of the money stock, the
rate of inflation must fall by more than the reduction in money growth. The
reason is that the demand forreal balances in the new low inflation steady
statewill be higher than in the high inflation equilibrium: the economy
produces real balances by causing the price level to grow more slowly than
the nominal money stock.
In an economy with fully flexible prices, credible government policy and
rational expectations, the start of a disinflation program can be accompanied
by a discrete rise in the money stock that will prevent the price level
jumping and thus inflicting capital gains and losses on nominal creditors and
debtors. However, the credibility problem posed by such a policy is obvious:
tostart a disinflation program with anincrease in the money stock is to
court the suspicion that announcements and actions are not closely related.
The difficulty is compounded by the similarity between a stock increase in
the money stock and a change in its growth rate when data are reported at
discrete intervals.
Departinent of Economics, M.I.T. and Research Associate, NBER. An earlier
version of this paper was written while I was Max Bogen Visiting Professor of
Economics at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. I am indebted to Rudiger
Dornbusch and Robert Gordon for comments, to Patricia Mosser for research
assistance, and the National Science Foundation for financial support.2
Inan economy where prices are not perfectlyflexible in theshort run,
asa result for example of long—term contracts,the increased demand for real
balances that accompanies a disinflation process increasesthe output costs
of disinflation, or the sacrifice ratio. The sacrificeratio is the ratio of
the percentage of GNP (at an annual rate) lost to thereduction in the
inflation rate. For instance, the sacrifice ratio forthe United States
disinflation, 1980—85, was about 5, meaning that over thatfive year period
cumulated GNP showed a reduction of 25 percent of one year's outputwhile the
inflation rate fell by about 5 percent, from 10 percent to 5 percent.This
sacrifice ratio is broadly consistent with the predictions of amodel with
price stickiness induced by the existenceof long—term labor contracts.1 It
is somewhat below earlier predictions of the output costsof disinflation by
Arthur Okun (1978) but in line with predictions, such as that ofRobert
Gordon (1982), that allowed for exchange—rate changes as an extra channel
throughwhich monetary policy affects the inflation rate.
The increase in real balancesis the best known ofthe real or relative
price adjustments that take place during a disinflation.In this paper I
examine in detail two other, less well understood, real phenomena that may
playan importantrole indeterminingthe output costs of disinflation. The
first is the exchange rate appreciation that accompanies monetary restriction
thatstartsthe disinflation process. The second is the role of indexation.
In each case there is a puzzle thatneedsresolution.
It is commonly argued that exchange rate appreciation during the United
States disinflation reduced the costs of the disinflation process relative to
costs that would have been incurred had the real exchange rate been held
1The calculation of the sacrifice ratio and its consistency with a simple
contracting model are presented in Fischer (1984).3
constant.The argument is that the rapid response of the exchange rate
brought the inflation rate down rapidly and further put pressure on wages
through enhanced foreign competition. (Rudiger Dornbusch and Fischer
(1984)). Countering this analysis are two points: first, anyexchangerate
appreciation has eventually to be reversed, thus implying that the early
gains on the inflation front are transformed into later losses; second, to
the extent that the exchange rate appreciation increases competitive
pressure, it does so through the creation of unemployment. Willem Buiter and
Marcus Miller (1983) conclude that exchange rate appreciation andsubsequent
depreciationduring a disinflation does not affect the sacrifice ratio.2
In the case of indexation, theoretical analysis shows that indexation
reduces the output costs of disinflation by permitting a more rapid response
ofwagesto the reduced rate of price increases. But policymakers typically
argue that wage indexation is a prime obstaclerather than an aidto
disinflation.
Inthis paper I analyze the roles oftheexchange rate and indexationin
disinflation,using simple models with long—term contracts and rational
expectations. In Section I, I present an open economy model in which the
sacrifice ratio is not independent ofthepath of the exchange rate during
disinflation. The real exchange rate appreciation typical at the start of a
disinflation may eitherincrease or decrease the sacrifice ratio relative to
theloss when the real exchange rateis held relative to the loss when the
realexchange rate is held constant. I identify the sources of the
2Buiter and Miller include a core inflation rate in the Phillips curve: this
rate is determined either by the current rate of money growth or by adaptive
expectations. E. John Driffill (1982) has extended the Buiter—Miller
analysis to examineoptimal disinflationpolicies.4
ambiguity, and the parameters determining the relativesacrifice ratios in
Section I.
In Section II, I turn to indexation, where the distinction between ex
post aridexante indexation is essential.3 Actual indexation is typicallyex
post, with the current wage adjusting to lagged pricelevels. As a result,
the real wage tends to rise in a disinflation when wages areindexed. This
increase in the real wage is probably the source of the view thatindexation
of wages is an obstacle rather than an aid to disinflation.
I. The Exchange Rate and Disinflation.
Suppose a disinflation program starts with a permanent reductionin the
growth rate of money, not anticipated to that point but fully credible
thereafter. Wages, set in contracts, are not fully flexible. Given wage
stickiness, the disinflation program produces a recession. Over time, wages
adjust and the economy moves towards full employment. The sacrificeratio is
a measure of the output loss during the transition to lower inflation.
The question in this section is how the openness of the economy affects
the sacrifice ratio. The Dornbusch (1976) overshooting result shows that the
real exchange rate will typically appreciate when the growth rate of the
money stock is reduced. The appreciation occurs becausethe restrictive
monetary policy raises the domestic nominal interest rate, while foreign
nominal intereast rates are either unchanged or increase less than the
domestic rate. Interest rate equalization then requires the expectation of a
depreciation of the domestic currency. Given long run neutrality of money, a
3Mario H. Simonsen (1983), who in 1965 helped design ex ante indexation in
Brazil, shows the effects of lagged indexation on real wages.5
depreciationcan be expected oiiy if the real exchange rate is currently
above the equilibrium level.
The model presented in this section includes four channels through which
the exchange rate appreciation affects the sacrifice ratio. First, to the
extent that imported goods are consumer goods, exchange rate appreciation
directly affects the CPI, tending to speed up the price response to the
reduced growth rate of money. To the extent that the CPI is the price level
relevant to the demand for nominal balances, the more rapid response of
prices means a smaller reduction in real balances and less deflationary
pressure. Second, if imported goods are factors of production, the
appreciation reduces costs, and thus has a favorable effect on domestic
supply price, again tending to reduce the sacrifice ratio. Third, if wages
adjust to the expected price level, any quick success in reducing the price
level will have the effect of reducing wages negotiated during the adjustment
period. The more rapidly wages come down, the smaller the output loss.
Fourth, exchange rate appreciation reduces the trade surplus, thereby
reducing demand for domestic goods and output. This effect increases the
sacrifice ratio.
Because the effects do not all operate in the same direction, it is not
surprising we do not find an unambiguous answer to the question of how
-
exchangerate appreciation during a disinflation affects the sacrifice
ratio.
Themodel is a modified IS—LM type with inflation and real interest rate
neutrality in the long run. Wages are set in contracts. Perfect capital
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= inprice of domestic output
=inof geometric average nominal wage
et =innominal exchange rate
tPt =E[ptlI±]where't—iis the information set at (t —i)
=E[ytIIt],where is in domestic output.
=inwage setin period t —ito apply at period t.
=realdomestic interest rate.
=nominaldomestic interest rate.
*denotesforeign variables (p* will be assumed equal to zero)
The exchange rate affects both aggregate supply, in equation (2), and
aggregate demand, in (3).Inboth cases an appreciation (decrease in
(e —q))tends to increase excess supply. The CPI, in(4),is directly
affected by the exchange ratethrough the price offinished goods imports.
Notethedistinction between the CPI, relevant to the demand for real
balances and the definitions of the nominal interest rate, and the price of
domestic output, q, which appears in the supply function (2) and in the net
export term in (3).7
Laborcontractsare for either one or two periods:t_lWtis the wage
set for t at time t —1,in all one—period contracts and in half the two—
period contracts; is the wage set at t —2for period t, in half the
two period contracts. The coefficient 0 is the proportion of wages that
wereset one period back. Those wages are set on the basis of expected
prices and the expected level of output. Labor contracts are the source of
imperfect price flexibility, and the reason the adjustment to an
unanticipated reduction in the growth rate of money causes a recession.5
Slow adjustment of expectations——about either policy directly or the rate of
inflation——is an alternative source of slow adjustment. I will comment below
ontheimplications of slow expectations adjustment for the relative costs of
disinflating with and withoutexchange rate appreciation.
Treatingthe average wage and expectations as predetermined, the model
is one in which aggregate demand (determined from the money and goods market
equilibriuniconditions (1) and(3)) and supply(2)interact to determine the
pricelevel and output. Given expectations, we can thinkof (8) as an
equilibriumcondition that helps determine the exchange rate.
We want now to examine the output costs of a disinflation program.
These costs can, in a model like that presented here, be reduced by
announcingtheprogram some time in advance, andalsoby sophisticated
manipulation of the growth rate of money during the adjustment period. But
because of credibility problems, I assume the policy change takes the form of
Note that t_t is not the expectation at (t —i)of a random variable, Wt,
but instead is the wage fixed at (t —i)to apply in period t.
5Contracts are for no more than twoperiodsfor the sake ofsimplicity.They
are for more than one period to allow the speedier initial disinflation that
occurs with exchange rate appreciation to influence the path of nominal
wages.8
anunannouncedand immediate fall in the growth rate of money by one
(percent). To analyze dynamics I assume expectationsare rational and that
the change in monetary policy is fullycredible once the initial cut in money
growth takes place:6 the policy changemaintains the new lower growth rate
of money.
The adjustment to the reduced growthrate ofmoneywill be over within
twoperiods, that is, by the start of periodtwo. This is because the
longest labor contract is for two periods:within two periods all outstanding
labor contracts have been renegotiated, takinginto account the lower steady
state inflation. By period two the real exchangerate is back to its
equilibrium level. Denoting by the change in the price level (and
similarly for other variables) in period jrelativeto the level it would
have attained had there been no change in monetary policy,we have
(9) =tqAs. =_[j+1+a] j)2.
Theinflationrate accordingly falls by one in steady state, whilereal
balancesrise relative to their previous level by the amount a, as aresult
of the lower nominal interest rate. The coefficient a,which is the extent
towhich the nominal interest rateaffects velocity, determines the magnitude
ofthe increase in real balances thathas totake place during the
disinflation.
Duringperiodszero andonethere are changes in real variables,
includingrealoutput and the real exchange rate. To examinethe
6ThFischer (i 984) I examine the costs of disinflation when expectationsof
policy adjust slowly to changes in policy. Asshould be expected, a lack of
credibilityincreases the sacrifice ratio. David Backusand John Drifihl
(1984)present a game—theoretic analysis of the role of credibilityin
determining the output costs of disinflation.9
determinantsof the real exchange rate appreciation, it is useful to work
back from the period—one relationship between the exchangerate and domestic
output price.7
(1+a) (2÷a)b1 (i—o)




Theperiod one real appreciation is an increasingfunction of the proportion
(i—&) of two—period contracts, of b1 ,theeffect of the real wage on supply,
anda, the interest elasticity of money demand;it is a decreasing function
of h, d, c and b2. These results can be suimnarized as showingthat factors
that tend to produce larger price level responses by period oneto the change
in monetary policy undertaken in period zero, reduce the extentof the real
appreciation.






Sincethe nominal wage is predetermined and does not respond to the changein
monetary policy in period zero, the structure of contracts()doesnot
directly enter (ii). Given the expectation of period one's real
7The model is solved by noting that =—1,m1 =—2,'2 =— 3, and
=e2
=—(3 + a)and then working back from the period 1 to the period
zero equilibrium.10
appreciation (te1 —q1)
affects the current real appreciation by its effect
on goods market equilibrium through the real interestrate. Butofcourse
q0is affected by allthe parameters of the model. Further manipulation of
equation(ii)does not, however, provide a tractable form of the expression
for(e0 —q0).The complete solution of the model is contained in the
Appendix.
In steady state (that is, period two and after), the inflation rate
falls by one. The sacrifice ratio is accordingly equal to the sumof output
lossesin periods zero andone:
(12)SRi =—[y0
+y1]
General expressions for y0 and y1 are presented in the Appendix.
Using the aggregate supply function, we obtain a convenient expression











Wewill later refer back to equation (13) in comparing the sacrifice ratio
withand without exchange rate appreciation. Equation (13) shows clearly the
basis for the conventional view that exchange rate appreciation reduces the
sacrifice ratio: with q0 and q1 given, the appreciation in both periods
zeroandone reduces SRi. The zer&th period appreciation has a supply side
effect through b2; the first period appreciation has both a supply side
effect and, through the term b10(1—u) an effect that arises because the
appreciation reduces the CPI and thus wages in period 1.
Understanding of the open economy effects on the sacrifice ratio is
gained by examining the special case in which there are only one period11
contracts (o=i). In this case there is no second period loss of output and






In this case, the output loss is increasing in (a, b1, c, d,ii)and
decreasing in b2. The loss increases in a because the required increasein
real balances to adjust to the new equilibrium is greater the larger is a;
increases in b1 becasue the rise in the real wage has a larger supplyeffect
the larger is b1; increases in c because the effect on aggregate demand of
the increase in the real interest rate is bigger the larger is c; increases
in d because the real exchange rate appreciation reduces aggregate demand
more the larger is d;8 and is increasing in jibecausethe larger is i,the
greater the effect of the exchange rate appreciation on the price leveland
thuson the real interest rate.9 The output loss decreases in b becausethe
exchange rate appreciation reduces the costs of imported inputs.
The main question we want to investigate is whether the sacrifice ratio
is higher or lower as a result of the real exchange rate appreciation. To
answer this question we have to specify the alternative policy:the
alternativeexamined here is to keep the real exchange rate constant at its
steady state level during the disinflation. This is carried out through a
capital import tax that effectively isolates the domestic capitalmarket and
preventsdomestic real interest appreciation from causingexchange rate
appreciation.With the real exchange rate held constant, the differential
81fthere was a J—curve, this effect would be delayed.
9Note that i.'mostlyenters the expression for y0in the form c'i.12
betweenthe domestic output price andCPIremains constant in the
disinflation process.10 Indeed, the dynamics of disinflation becomethose of
a closed economy.
The sacrifice ratio when the real exchange rate is held fixed canbe
calculated as:11
(14) SR2 =- b1[q0+ q11
comparing (13) and(14),and noting that in (14), q1 =e1,
we appear to see
that the real exchange rate appreciation reduces the sacrifice ratio——both
through the cost side and.becauseit speeds up the adjustment of wages.
However this intuitive comparison of (13) and(14)is misleading in
implicitlytreating and q1 asindependent ofexchange rate behavior.
Thedomesticprice level falls more when the exchange rate appreciates, and
on those grounds appreciation tends to increase the output loss. Thusit is
not obvious that SRi < SR2, i.e. that the sacrifice ratio is smaller with
exchange rate appreciation.
Indeed, asTable 1 shows, there isno unambiguous relationship between
SRiand SR2. The output costs ofdisinflationmay be either larger or
smaller when the exchange rate is allowed to appreciate than when it is held
constant.Table 1 suggests both the sources of theambiguity and the
determinants ofthe extent of output loss when the exchange rate adjusts.
101nthemodified system, through appropriate choice of constants, equation
(3) loses the terms following d; (4) becomes Pt = andthe second equality
in (8) is removed.
110eneral expressions are presented in the Appendix.13
Table 1Disinflation With and Without Exchange Rate Appreciation
(Base case is: a=.25, b1=.75, b2=.15, c=.15, d=.2, '=.8, O=.5, h=.5)
Parameters*
With appreciation Withoutappreciation
y0y1ze0—zq0e1—q1SRi SR2 Y1 O i
Base case—.29—.32 —1.27 —1.01 .61 .73—.31—.43 —.41 —1.34
a=.1 —.26—.31 —1.17 — .97.57 .81—.36—.45 —.49 —1.42
a=1 —.41—.40—1.75 —1.26 .81 .66—.23—.43 —.30—1.36
b2=0 —.36—.39—1.59 —1.23.76 .73—.31—.43 —.41 —1.34
b2=.6 —.18—.21— .80 — .66.39 .73—.31—.43 —.41 —1.34
d=0 —.08—.19—2.23 —1.57.27 .73—.31—.43 —.41 —1.34
d=.8 —.44—.45—0.54 —0.49.89 .73—.31—.43 —.41 —1.34
*Th each caso, onlyone paraineter valuevariesfromthosein the base case.
In particular, the direct supply (b2) and demand (d) side effects of the
exchangerate appreciation can by themselves reverse the relationship between
SRiand SR2. For instance, when b2 =0,we find SR2 < SRI, but with b1
somewhat larger, the inequality is reversed. With b2 equal to the direct
effect on output supply of a reduction in the cost of imported materials, the
reasonfor this result is obvious. Similarly, with d, the direct effect of
the exchange rate on aggregate demand equal to zero, SRi < SR2. The interest
elasticity of money demand likewise has a significant impact on the sacrifice
ratio. A low elasticity ofmoneydemand tends to produce relatively small
appreciationsand a lower sacrifice ratio.
• Although analytical results are difficult to derive, calculations of
examplesover a wide range of parametervalues show the following intuitive
features:increases in b1, the sensitivity of output to the real wage14
increase the sacrifice ratios for both models;increases in c, the real
interest elasticity of aggregate demand likewiseincrease the sacrifice
ratios in both models; an increase in ji-—areduction in the significance of
imported goods in the CPI—— increasesthe sacrifice ratio in the case where
the exchange rate appreciates; increasesin 0, the proportion of two year
contracts, increase the sacrifice ratiofor both models; increases in h, the
sensitivity of the wage to expected output,reduce the sacrifice ratios for
both models. None of these results is in any way surprising.
Ifall contracts are one period (0 =1)we can show directly the factors
determiningthe relationship between SRi and. SR2. Using the expressionsfor
andy1in the appendix, with 0 =1,we obtain
b
(15) SRi SR2as d +1)[1 -+
Notefirst that without a sizeable direct effect of the appreciationon
aggregate demand (d), the sacrifice ratio with appreciation(SRI) is bound to
be less than that without appreciation (SR2). Theeffects of b and i.ionthe
inequality are similarly straightforward: the largerthe supply effect (b2)
and the larger the weight (i -i)of the exchange rate in the price index,
the more likely SR2isto exceed SRi. Similarly, the larger is c andthe
smaller are a and b, the more likely is SR2toexceed SRI.
These results clearly establish that the sacrifice ratiois not
invariant to the path of the exchange rate, contrary to theBuiter—Miller
result (op. cit.). There are two reasons for the different results.First,
the alternative policy of controlling the exchange rate throughtaxation of
capitalinflows is not considered in B.iiter—Mi1ler.Second, in this model
wagesrespond to expected policy actions, whereasBuiter—Miller require
expectations to be affected only by actual rates of inflation.In their case15
it takes unemployment rather than expected policy actions to force down the
core rate of inflation.
Althoughthe normal presumption would be that exchange rate appreciation
reduces the sacrifice ratio, that is not necessarily so. Large aggregate
demand effects of the appreciation can make for large output losses.Of
coursethere is a general presumption that the output costs of disinflation
can be made lower when both the exchange rate and price of domestic output
can be adjusted optimally. But whether the appropriate policy is to
appreciate or depreciate the exchange rate depends on the parameters of the
economy.
II. Indexation and Disinflation.
Indexation of wage payments to the price level can take several forms
We distinguish among ex post, ex ante, and lagged ex post indexation. In
discussing these formsofindexation, we assume that the price index is
available only with a lag, typically two weeks, after the month to which is
applies. The lag is in practice about a month since the index refers to
prices centered on the middle of the month. We take the lag of the index as
given.
Ex post indexation would make the wage payment for, say, June,
contingent on the actual June price index. The June wages could, for
instance, be paid on the day after the index appears. By that date the price
level that determines the real value of the wage is different from the price
level for which the wage was calculated. Given the price indexlag,there is
no way of providing a truly certain real wage. In light of this difficulty,
ex post indexation is in practice lagged: the wage paid at the end of June is
adjusted for price level changes up to and including May (providing indexing16
is monthly). The distinction between ex post and lagged ex postindexing
turnsonwhether anyone who worked in Juneand thenleaves the job will later
receive compensation for the June price rise. If theyreceive compensation,
indexation is genuinely ex post; if not, it is lagged ex post.
Ex ante indexation makes the nominal wage paid in Juneconditional on
the price level expected at the end of Nay toobtain in June. Such
indexation is important only in long term contracts.If contracts are for
onlyone period, then the nominal wage willin any event reflect the price
level expected to obtain in the period ofwork.Ex ante indexation hasbeen
used (by the government) inBrazil,but isnotwidely practiced.
To clarify thediscussion, consider wage setting with oneandtwoperiod
contractsin aclosed economy version ofthemodel of Section I. Some wages
for period t were set at the end of (t -1):they are determined by
(16)lwt =t-it
+ht_iyt
Since these wages are set for the next period, there is no indexing,but









The term in A1 representslagged expost indexing of the wage: the wage for
period t is adjusted on the basis of the actual period(t —1)price level.
Ex ante indexation is represented by the coefficient A2:the wage for period
t is adjusted on the basis of the price level expected atthe end of (t —1)
for period t.
Exante indexation is a method of effectively reducing contract length
in an economy with long term contracts, with respect to expected pricelevel
changes. For A2 =I(and A1 =0)ex ante indexed wages are, with respect to
the price level, the same as those in one period contracts.17
The difficulty with ex post indexation (from now on we omit the
'lagged') can be seen by examining (17) when all variables take their




Giventhe wage equation (17), the real wage is lower the higher the inflation
rate. This phenomenon has been analyzed by Modigliani and Padoa-Schioppa
(1978) and Simonsen (1983); in effect it makes for a long—run tradeoff
betweeninflation and output.Such a tradeoff no doubt would not persist
sinceittakes only a negotiation over the wage level to remove it. During a
disinflation, the nominal wage level has to be negotiated down; however, the
adjustment leavesthe real wage unchanged.Such an adjustment at the
beginningofa disinflation program is likely to arouse the suspicions of
labor,and to be resisted until the disinflation shows signsof working.
Because of the difficulty of renegotiating the level, ex post indexation
creates difficulties for successful disinflation through its automatic
effects on the real wage.12










12ff thewage bargain aims to reach the equilibrium real wage, then the wage
formula may be re—negotiated as contracts re—open. Ireferto this
possibility infootnote 14 below.18
and the wage equations (16) and(j7)•13
Wenow consider the output costsof disinflation under three alternative
assumptions about indexing: noindexation (x1= A2=0);complete ex ante
indexing (A2 =1);and complete lagged ex post indexing (x11).Once
again, a disinflation programis instituted in period zero by reducing the
growthrate of money by one. For purposesof analysis we assume there is no
readjustment of the base wage levelwith ex post indexation.
In the case of both non—indexed andexante indexed wages, the real
adjustmentto the disinflation takes the form of a temporaryreduction in
output. With ex post indexation thereis apermanent reductionin output.











Thegeneral outline of the results can be seenfrom (21 )—(23). With no
indexation, real adjustment takes two periods.With complete ex ante
indexing, output is below its full employmentlevel only in period zero. All
contracts thereafter adjust fully for the expectedlower prices, and there is
no further output loss. This is the basisof the argument that indexation
helps speed up disinflation.
However, comparison of the sacrifice ratiobetween the non—indexed
(x1= A2=0)and ex ante indexed cases requires some care. The impact
effect of the disinflation is different in the two cases.The price level in
13The coefficient b1 in equation (2) is replaced in (19) by b.19
periodzero falls more when the system is fully indexed than when it is not
indexed. This is because the price level adjustment in period one is greater
inthe indexed system and thusthe realinterest rate in period zerois
higherand output is lower.
Accordingly, with ex ante indexation the impacteffectof the
disinflation is greater: the initial recession is more serious (provided the
demandfor money is interest elastic). Buttherecession is over more
quickly. The question then arises whether the total output costis greater
inthe indexed case. Simple calculations show that the total scrifice ratio
is higher when wages are not indexed than when they are. Ex ante indexation
of wages accordingly reduces the output costs of disinflation by producing a
shorter, sharper recession when the new monetary regime goes into effect.
Thecomparison between the non—indexed and expost indexed systems is
interesting. The long run calculation is clear: if the real wage level is
not adjusted downwards at some stage, the sacrifice ratio for the ex post
indexed system is infinite, andlargerthan the sacrifice ratio for the non—
indexed system. Butthe comparison inthe early stages of disinflation is
notunambiguously infavor of the non—indexed system.
Assumefor purposes of discussion that a =0,so that the real interest
rate channel by which expected future deflation affects current output is cut
off. In period zero the nominal wage is given. The extent of the zero'th
period recession is thus the same between the two systems. (If a were not
equal to zero, the first period recession would be bigger in the indexed
system.)
We want now to compare output losses in period one. In both systems
those wages that were negotiated at the end of period zero have reacted to
the disinflation program. In the indexed system, indexed wages are reduced20
toa level below those onnon—indexed contracts, as a result of the lower
price level in period zero. The presumtpiOflis then that output costs in
period one will be lower in theindexed system.









b(1 0) 1 +
1+bhO
The more rapid deflation in the indexed system is a result of the lower
average nominal wage level in period 1in that system, for output in the
indexed system is given by
t b(1-o)(i + 2b)
26 y1 EPI=— (1+b)[1+bh0+b(1—o)J




Thelatter output loss is larger.
The conclusion is then that even ex post indexation maybe an aid to
rapid disinflation,by permitting someflexibility in the right direction in
wages set by longterm contracts. But unlessthe base level nominal wage is
resetappropriately, jost indexingwill create morelong run outputcosts
thanwould occur in a non-indexed system.'
The appropriate level readjustmenttakes place automatically with ex
ante indexing. That is why ex ante indexation provides thelowest sacrifice
1If the wage level under ex post indexation is negotiated downatthe
reopening of each contract, then disinflation hasa loweroutput cost with ex
post indexation than when wagesarenot indexed.21
ratio. But ex ante indexation, it has to be recognized, is an unusual
conceptinthat itexplicitly sets wages on the basis of some agreed upon
price level forecast. Such forecasts are used by both sidesto wage
negotiations, but they typically remain in the background. It isnot
difficult to imagine that negotiators could agree that the forecasts of some
respected institution or economist could serve this purpose.
III. Conclusions.
In this paper I have examined the consequences for the sacrifice ratio
of changes in real variables that may take place during a disinflation. In
addition to the well knowa reduction in the price level relative to trend
arising from an increase in the demand for real balances, we considered the
effects of exchange rate appreciation and wage indexation on the costs of
disinflation.
There appears to be no unambiguous presumption about the effects of
exchange rate appreciation on the output costs of disinflation. But contrary
to other results, we did not find the sacrifice ratio to be invariant to the
path of the exchange rate. The major factors tending to make disinflation
with exchange rate appreciation less costly are a large supply side effect of
the real appreciation, and a large share of imports in the consumer price
index. A large demand side effect through reduced net exports can be
sufficient to make the sacrifice ratio with appreciation larger than that
when the real exchange rate is held constant.
Indexation, ex ante or ex post, speeds up the response of the economy to
disinflation. In the early stages of the disinflation, indexation reduces
the extent of the recession (measured by total loss of output relative to
trend) caused by an unannounced but thenceforth fully credible reduction in22
the growth rate of the economy. Butunlessthere is a base nominal wage
adjustment, the application of ex post indexing byformula will have a long
term recessionary effect. Such real wagelevel effects of indexation may
well account for the blame it receives an an impedimentto disinflation.23
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Appendix
This appendix contains general expressions for changesin the price
level,exchange rate, outut, and real interest rate followingthe change in
monetarypolicy.





































(A14) r0 =- 2.
= b1(c+a)+(1+a)c